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 A showup identification is the presentation of a single suspect to an eyewitness. I used a 
simulated theft paradigm and subsequent showup identification to examine the effects of stolen 
property, suspects’ verbal behaviour, and target-presence on eyewitness identification 
performance. I used a 2 (suspect: innocent, guilty) X 2 (stolen property: present, hidden) X 3 
(verbal behaviour: denial with explanation, denial, silence) between-subjects factorial design. 
Binary logistic regression analysis indicated that both the target and stolen property, 
independently, and significantly predicted the accuracy of identification decisions. Surprisingly, 
the presence of stolen property facilitated more accurate identification decisions from 
eyewitnesses.  
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Showup Identifications: The Effects of Presence of Stolen Property and Suspect’s Denial on 
Identification Performance 
As the number of DNA-based exonerations continue to grow, so too does recognition of 
the fallibility of eyewitness identification. To date, the Innocence Project has exonerated 268 
wrongfully convicted individuals (www.InnocenceProject.org). Mistaken eyewitness 
identification has contributed to approximately seventy-five percent of these wrongful 
convictions (Innocence Project, 2009; Garrett, 2011). For decades, laboratory research at the 
intersection of psychology and law has illustrated the potential for eyewitness identifications to 
go awry.  
 Historically, Harvard Professor Hugo Munsterberg paved the way for future research at 
this intersection. His collection of essays entitled On the Witness Stand (1908) presents several 
psycho-legal phenomena that are relevant to this day. After Munsterberg, research in this area 
went relatively dormant until interest grew in rampant proportions during the 1970s. One 
important development during this era was the categorization of system and estimator variables 
(Wells, 1978). Variables that affect the quality of eyewitness identification, which criminal 
justice personnel have little or no control over, are called estimator variables. For example, law 
enforcement personnel cannot control for an eyewitness’ poor viewing conditions, but 
investigators can estimate the effects of viewing conditions on identification performance. On the 
contrary, those variables that law enforcement personnel have at least some control over are 
called system variables.  Law enforcement personnel have the potential to manipulate system 
variables—such as the manner in which lineups are conducted—in an effort to prevent mistaken 
identification (Wells, 1978). In the present study, I examined the effects of two system variables 
– verbal behaviour of the suspect and stolen property – on eyewitness identifications from 
showup identification procedures.  




Showup identification procedures receive regular use (Behrman & Davey, 2001; 
Gonzalez, Ellsworth & Pembroke, 2001) and yet receive little attention from eyewitness 
researchers in comparison to lineup identifications. Using a simulated theft paradigm, I evaluated 
the effects of the presence of stolen property, and the suspects’ verbal behaviour on identification 
performance from showups. The objectives of this study were to gain a firmer understanding of 
the variables affecting the quality of showup identifications and to contribute to the literature in 
this area. Currently, the phenomenology1 of innocence is a theory coined by Kassin (2005) to 
account for the behaviour of innocent suspects in interrogations. In the present study, I derived 
my hypotheses concerning eyewitness performance from this theoretical construct in conjunction 
with relevant literature.  
Eyewitness Identifications from Lineups 
In recent decades, eyewitness research has made several critical developments, perhaps 
most favourably, in the area of lineup identifications. A lineup is a procedure in which law 
enforcement personnel present, ideally, one suspect (Wells & Turtle, 1986) amongst fillers – non-
suspects whom are included in a lineup to reduce the impact of guessing – to an eyewitness. The 
eyewitness views the lineup and decides if the perpetrator from the event she or he witnessed is 
present, and if so, identifies that individual. This procedure is either live or photographic.  
Lineups have received much attention from eyewitness researchers. Given that the 
criminal justice system has direct control over the construction of lineups, logically, manipulating 
lineups might be the most effective approach to curtail mistaken identification. High-quality 
lineups have the potential to prevent mistaken identification and thus, ultimately, wrongful 
                                                      
1 Kassin (2005) uses the term phenomenology quite literally to refer to the ironic and unexpected observation that by 
virtue of being innocent, innocent individuals might be at risk during interrogation. Kassin (2005) by no means uses 
the term phenomenology in a manner consistent with phenomenologists. Phenomenologists are not concerned with 
the empirical observation of sociological phenomena but rather with the subjective interpretation of those 
phenomena (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). 




convictions. Accordingly, hundreds of studies, meta-analyses, journal articles, books, 
encyclopaedia entries and conference presentations have been devoted to eyewitness research in 
general and lineup methods in particular.  
 This array of research has lead to the development of recommended best practices 
designed to safeguard against false identification. Some of the practices include the use of: single 
suspect lineups, fillers that match the perpetrator’s description, instructions that warn the 
eyewitness that the perpetrator might not be present in the lineup, double-blind lineup 
administration, and the sequential (rather than simultaneous) presentation of lineup members. 
 The need to use single-suspect lineups—I will refer to both photographic and live lineups 
generally as lineups, given that the research findings presumably apply to both—becomes clear 
through considering the inverse. If a lineup contains all suspects and no fillers, than no matter 
whom the eyewitness identifies she has identified a suspect. Thus, it becomes impossible to 
distinguish whether the eyewitness identified the suspect from memory or if she guessed or 
deduced the identity of the suspect. On the contrary, if a lineup contains only one suspect and the 
remaining persons in the lineup are fillers, the ability of the eyewitness to deduce or guess the 
identity of the suspect decreases, and criminal justice personnel can be more confident that the 
eyewitness’ identification is attributable to her memory for the perpetrator (Wells & Turtle, 
1986). 
 Fillers should match the description of the perpetrator (Wells, Malpass, Lindsay, Fisher, 
Turtle & Fulero, 2000). When attempting a lineup identification, an eyewitness is likely to look 
for the presence of characteristics that she or he initially provided when identifying the 
perpetrator. Selecting fillers that match the perpetrator’s description, as provided by the 
eyewitness, ensures that the suspect does not stand out in the lineup and makes it more difficult 
for an eyewitness to identify a suspect by deduction.  




 When conducting a lineup it is also important to instruct the eyewitness that the 
perpetrator might or might not be in the lineup. By explicitly stating this caveat, an eyewitness 
with a weak memory of the perpetrator will be less likely to try to guess or deduce the identity of 
the suspect (Malpass & Devine, 1981).  Unbiased lineup instructions have been shown 
consistently to reduce the risk of false identification (Steblay, 1997). 
 A lineup is analogous to a scientific experiment. Accordingly, similar to laboratory 
research, a double-blind administration should be used (Wells & Luus, 1990). Applying a double-
blind procedure to lineup identifications simply means that the law enforcement personnel 
interacting with the eyewitness during the lineup procedure do not know the identity of the 
suspect in the lineup. This ensures that criminal justice personnel are not implicitly, or explicitly, 
communicating the identity of the suspect to the eyewitness. Past research suggests that 
investigator knowledge of suspect identity increases the rate at which eyewitnesses mistakenly 
identify innocent suspects in sequential lineups (Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999).  
 Finally, it is argued that sequential presentation is the preferred method for conducting 
lineups (Wells et al. 2000; Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001). The traditional 
simultaneous method presents lineup members (suspect and fillers) to the eyewitness at the same 
time.  Lindsay and Wells (1985) hypothesized that this method of presentation encourages 
relative judgments – viewing all members of the lineup simultaneously might encourage 
eyewitnesses to select the individual that most resembles the perpetrator relative to other lineup 
members. In order to reduce the likelihood that an eyewitness will attempt to guess or deduce the 
identity of the suspect Lindsay and Wells (1985) devised the sequential method of presentation. 
In sequential lineups: members are presented to the eyewitness one at a time, the eyewitness must 
make an identification decision after each member, once the eyewitness makes an identification 
decision regarding a lineup member she cannot view that member again, the eyewitness does not 




know how many members will be included in the lineup, and if the eyewitness makes an 
affirmative identification, the lineup parade is discontinued and she cannot view the remaining 
members of the lineup (Lindsay & Wells, 1985). By presenting lineup members in sequential 
order, eyewitnesses are less likely to engage in relative judgments comparing lineup members to 
one another and selecting the one that most resembles the perpetrator. Instead, the sequential 
method of presentation encourages eyewitnesses to engage in more absolute judgment decisions 
comparing each lineup member to his or her memory of the perpetrator  (Lindsay & Wells, 
1985).  One of the most comprehensive comparisons of sequential and simultaneous lineups 
suggests that sequential presentation decreases the risk of false identification (Steblay, Dysart, 
Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001). Despite these findings, not all eyewitness researchers have accepted 
the sequential lineup as the preferred method of presentation. Malpass, Tredoux, & McQuiston-
Surrett (2009) point to a reduction in correct identifications, errors in research, and other 
methodological issues as evidence that the superiority of sequential lineups has not yet been 
demonstrated. Moreover, other researchers point to specific contexts in which there might be a 
sequential advantage: when the lineup is backloaded (for example, when the suspect appears in 
the fifth or sixth position of a 6 person lineup) or when the lineup is biased – when the suspect is 
discernibly different from fillers (Carlson, Gronlund, & Clark, 2008). 
Showups 
 The aforementioned best practices for conducting lineups illustrate some practical 
applications resulting from eyewitness research; however, few studies have focused on showup 
identifications. A showup identification is a procedure in which law enforcement personnel 
present a suspect to an eyewitness in absence of fillers. It is a “one-to-one confrontation” between 
the eyewitness and suspect (Gonzalez et al. 1993). Showup identifications can be live or 
photographic. Most commonly, law enforcement personnel use showups when they find an 




individual matching an eyewitness description in close proximity to the crime, both 
geographically and temporally (Kassin, Ellsworth & Smith, 1989). Using showups in this context 
produces at least three advantages, (1) due to their close temporal proximity, showups might limit 
the effects of memory decay, (2) suspects identified as innocent are immediately released 
(Gonzalez et al. 1993), and (3) showups create reasonable and probable grounds for detaining a 
potentially guilty suspect.  
Theoretically, however, the most significant drawback to showups is that showups do not 
allow criminal justice personnel to catch guessers (Gonzalez et al. 1993). As noted above, an all-
suspect lineup would make it difficult to distinguish whether the eyewitness recognized the 
suspect from her memory of the perpetrator or just guessed or deduced the suspect’s identity. 
This line of reasoning is also applicable to showup identifications. Given that law enforcement 
personnel present a suspect to an eyewitness without fillers, law enforcement personnel cannot 
distinguish whether the eyewitness has identified the suspect because the suspect matches her 
memory of the perpetrator or if she has identified the suspect because she is guessing or deducing 
that this single suspect is the perpetrator.  
Incidence of Showup Identifications 
Despite the possible limitations of showup identifications, it is likely that for the 
aforementioned advantages law enforcement personnel will continue to use showups as a method 
of identification.  As evidence of this trend, the research shows that showups are already 
commonly used. Behrman and Davey (2001) conducted an archival analysis on 271 cases of 
crimes committed from 1987-1998 in the jurisdiction of the Sacramento City Police Department. 
The researchers analyzed 689 identification attempts: 258 live showups, 18 photographic 
showups, 284 photographic lineups, 58 live lineups, and 66 identifications classified separately 
because law enforcement personnel presented the eyewitness with multiple identification 




procedures. Of the 684 identification methods listed, 276 (40%) were of the showup variety. In 
addition, they compared suspect identification rates across photographic lineups (N = 284) and 
showups (n = 258) and found a significant difference in suspect identification rates. Eyewitnesses 
presented with a photographic lineup identified the suspect 48% of the time, while eyewitnesses 
presented with a showup identified the suspect 76% of the time (Behrman & Davey, 2001).  The 
accuracy of these suspect identifications, however, is unknown. 
Actual Innocence and Showups 
 Of the first 250 DNA-based exonerations in the United States, 190 (76%) entailed 
mistaken identification (Garrett, 2011). Garrett (2011) was able to obtain, and examined, trial 
materials from 161 (85%) of those cases. Of the 161 misidentified exonerees and 278 
identification tests examined, 118 exonerees were mistakenly identified in a photographic lineup, 
61 in a live lineup, 46 from composite images, and 53 in either a live or photographic showup.  
As noted above and as mentioned by Garrett (2011), showups are justified when conducted in 
close proximity to the crime, both geographically and temporally. Of the 53 exonerees wrongly 
identified in showups only 11 (21%) exonerees were identified in justified, “crime-scene” 
showups (Garrett, 2011).  Still, those 11 showups that were conducted at the crime scene were 
not immune from increased suggestiveness. Garrett (2011) points to exoneree, Gene Bibbins’ 
showup, in which he was presented to the eyewitness from the back of a police car as evidence of 
increased suggestiveness in a showup identification procedure. The remaining 42 exonerees were 
identified in showups removed both geographically and temporally from the scene of the crime 
(Garrett, 2011).   
Gonzalez, Ellsworth, and Pembroke (1993) 
 Gonzalez et al. (1993) conducted two experiments and an archival study designed to 
contrast eyewitness performance from lineups and showups. The first experiment used a staged 




theft in a classroom setting in which the perpetrator stole a purse from the professor. 
Experimenters subsequently presented participants with one of a (1) target present lineup, (2) 
target absent lineup, (3) target present showup or (4) target absent showup. In eyewitness 
research perpetrators are referred to as targets. Therefore, if the target is present this means that 
the perpetrator is in the identification procedure and if the target is absent this means that the 
perpetrator is not in the identification procedure. Gonzalez et al. (1993) tested the hypothesis that 
participants presented with a lineup are more likely to engage in relative judgment decisions 
when making identifications, but participants presented with showups are more likely to engage 
in absolute judgment decisions. Supporting the hypothesis, participants in the lineup conditions 
were significantly more likely to say that the perpetrator was present than were participants in the 
showup conditions. Participants were more likely to say “yes” the perpetrator is there when 
presented with a lineup, across both target absent and target present conditions. In target present 
conditions, three (30%) participants made a correct identification from a showup, whereas, six 
(67%) participants made a correct identification from a lineup. In target absent conditions, 
however, 11 (92%) participants rejected the showup identification, whereas, only five (38%) 
participants rejected the lineup identification (Gonzalez et al. 1993).   
Gonzalez et al.’s (1993) second experiment further examined the variables in the first 
experiment and the effects of suspect similarity on eyewitness identification. The experimenters 
employed a 2  (target: absent, present) X 3 (foil similarity: high, medium, and low) factorial 
design to examine lineup identifications. Likewise, target present and absent showups were 
examined. The similarity of the suspect to the perpetrator was manipulated as high or low in 
target absent showups. Of 10 participants presented with a target present showup, none made a 
positive identification. On the contrary, 15 of 25 participants in the target present lineup provided 
identifications. And, most importantly, in the target-present-low-suspect-similarity condition, six 




of nine participants made identifications. This discrepancy between target present showups and 
target present lineups indicates that the two identification methods are likely not equivalent 
(Gonzalez et al. 1993).  
 Their third study was an archival analysis. The researchers compared lineups and 
showups in the field. Almost all of the 172 showups were live, whereas all of the 52 lineups 
included were photographic. Results support the two aforementioned laboratory experiments. 
Eyewitnesses presented with showup identifications were again less likely to say that the 
perpetrator was present than were eyewitnesses presented with lineup identifications. Possible 
confounds in this analysis include the use of photographic lineups versus live showups and a 
large discrepancy in memory intervals between the two identification methods. Eyewitnesses 
who participated in a lineup did so between three hours and three weeks after the commission of 
the offence; the mode was approximately a week. Alternatively, eyewitnesses who participated in 
a showup did so between fifteen minutes and two weeks after the commission of the offence; the 
mode was approximately two hours (Gonzalez et al. 1993). 
Yarmey, Yarmey, and Yarmey (1994) 
In Yarmey, Yarmey, and Yarmey’s (1994) study, one of two targets interchangeably 
approached participants in a naturalistic field setting and initiated a short conversation 
(approximately fifteen seconds). Approximately two minutes later, another experimenter 
approached the same participant for the identification component of the experiment. The actual 
identification procedure took place approximately five minutes after the original encounter 
between the target and participant. Researchers asked participants to identify the target in one of, 
a photographic showup identification, a simultaneous photographic lineup, a voice showup, or a 
six-person voice lineup. The experimenter used unbiased instructions when presenting the 
identification procedure to the participant. There was no significant difference between 




photographic showup and lineup identifications; however, identifications from lineups were 
significantly more accurate than one would expect by chance, conversely, no significant 
difference was found between identifications from showups and chance expectations (Yarmey et 
al. 1994). 
Yarmey, Yarmey, and Yarmey (1996) 
Yarmey, Yarmey and Yarmey’s (1996) primary interest remained in the comparison of 
showups and lineups, and secondly, the researchers were concerned with measuring the effects of 
clothing bias and memory retention on showup and lineup identifications. The researchers 
hypothesized that similar clothing worn by an innocent suspect during the identification phase of 
the study would increase the likelihood of mistaken identification. The researchers followed the 
same procedure as the Yarmey et al. (1994) study. The researchers employed a 2 (confederate: 
one, two) X 2 (identification method: showup, lineup) X 2 (target: present, absent) X 2 (clothing: 
same, different) X 4 (memory interval: immediate, 30 minutes, 2 hours, 24 hours) between-
subjects factorial to assess the results (Yarmey et al. 1996). In the target present condition, 
showups produced significantly more accurate identifications than lineups. Same clothing as 
opposed to different clothing also significantly increased the likelihood of identification at the 
two-hour memory interval. In the target absent condition, showups produced significantly more 
accurate rejections than lineups. In addition, same clothing produced significantly more false 
suspect identifications in the twenty-four hour memory interval across both lineups and showups. 
At both two and twenty-four hour memory intervals, participants were four times more likely to 
produce a mistaken identification when presented with a showup identification as opposed to a 
lineup identification method. In addition, same clothing produced significantly more mistaken 
identifications in showups opposed to lineups.  




In their second experiment, Yarmey et al. (1996) focused solely on live showup 
identifications. They used the same methodical approach as experiment one, however, a third, 
dissimilar suspect condition was also included in conjunction with the high-similarity suspect 
condition. The experimenters employed a 2 (confederate: one, two) X 2 (target: present, absent) 
X 2 (clothing: same, different) X 4 (memory interval: immediate, 30 minutes, two hours, 24 
hours) between-subjects factorial design.  Across all conditions, the dissimilar suspect did not 
produce an effect across memory intervals or because of clothing bias. Participants performed 
better in the target absent condition. Participants were more likely to make a correct judgment in 
the different clothing condition as opposed to the same clothing condition. The researchers found 
an interaction between target availability, clothing, and identification performance. When 
presented with an innocent suspect in different clothing from that of the perpetrator, participants 
were significantly more likely to provide a correct nonidentification than when the innocent 
suspect was presented wearing the same clothing as the perpetrator. Additionally, the researchers 
found a significant interaction effect between target presence, memory interval, and identification 
performance: In the target absent condition participants performed significantly better than in the 
target present condition, but only in the immediate memory interval.  Finally, in comparing their 
two experiments, the researchers found no significant difference between live and photographic 
showup identifications. Participants, however, did perform marginally better when presented with 
a live as opposed to photographic identification method except in the immediate memory 
interval, in which the photographic identification method was superior (Yarmey et al. 1996). 
Dysart, Lindsay, and Dupuis (2006) 
 Dysart, Lindsay, and Dupuis (2006) investigated the effects of suspect similarity, the type 
of clothing worn at the original event and clothing-bias on showup identifications. The target 
approached employees at shopping malls in Southern Ontario and requested their participation in 




a psychology study. The target further explained that an experimenter would return later to 
conduct the study. At that time, the experimenter instructed the participant that the experimenter 
would show the participant a photograph and ask the participant to indicate if it was the 
individual who asked the participant to participate in the study (Dysart et al. 2006). 
 Suspect similarity conditions consisted of target present, high and low similarity innocent 
suspects. During the initial interaction, the target wore either common or distinct clothing. For 
the purposes of this study, common clothing was a bluish-grey short-sleeved plaid shirt. The 
distinct clothing was a black Harley-Davidson t-shirt with a motorcycle, blue eagle wings, and 
the Harley-Davidson emblem. Dysart et al. (2006) manipulated clothing worn at the initial 
interaction to be either the same or different during the identification phase. The researchers also 
examined the effects of distinct clothing that was similar to but different from that worn during 
the initial interaction on identification accuracy. The different but similar distinct clothing was a 
very similar but different Harley-Davison t-shirt (Dysart et al. 2006). 
  The memory interval ranged from ten minutes to four hours. However, memory interval 
produced no significant difference in identification accuracy. High-similarity between an 
innocent suspect and perpetrator in showup identifications increased the likelihood of mistaken 
identification. Moreover, the researchers found an interaction between clothing type and clothing 
bias. Clothing bias was only significant in the distinct clothing condition. Finally, the researchers 
also found that similar but different distinct clothing produced the same effect as distinct clothing 
on identification accuracy—it decreased identification accuracy (Dysart et al. 2006).  
Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, and Lindsay (2003)  
 Steblay, Dysart, Fulero and Lindsay (2003) conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis 
comparing lineup and showup identification methods. The study includes eight papers, twelve 
hypothesis tests and 3013 participants. All of the showup studies I have reviewed with the 




exception of the Dysart et al. (2006) study were included in the meta-analysis. Dysart et al. 
(2006) conducted their study subsequent to the meta-analysis so, obviously, it could not be 
included in the meta-analysis. Steblay et al. (2003) predicted that showups would lead to more 
false identifications than lineups.  The authors examined three dependent variables: (1) total 
correct identifications, (2) correct identifications of perpetrators, and (3) mistaken identification 
errors.  
Results indicated that participant-eyewitnesses shown showups are significantly more 
likely to produce a correct identification decision than participants shown lineups. Showup 
identifications were marginally advantageous in target present conditions and were significantly 
advantageous in target absent conditions. Despite the overall results suggesting the supremacy of 
showup over lineup identifications, the findings also indicate that when the innocent suspect 
closely resembles the perpetrator, showups put the suspect at greater risk of mistaken 
identification than lineups. The researchers found other moderator effects including increased 
accuracy in showup identifications across target present conditions for child participants, studies 
that did not employ staged crimes, and for female perpetrators. The researchers’ further note that 
the effects of these moderators are confounded within respective studies and therefore, the effects 
are inseparable.  Additionally, the favourability of showups over lineups increased when 
considering only adult participants. Marginally favourable improvements in lineups were 
associated with undergraduate participants. The favourability of lineups was also associated with 
increased memory intervals. Lineups were also marginally favourable when the perpetrator was a 
male. Finally, in one study, lineup favourability also increased because of participants viewing an 
in-class staged crime (Steblay et al. 2003). 
 
 




Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smith (1989) 
 Sixty-three experts in the area of eyewitness identification responded to a questionnaire 
designed to assess the level of consensus on twenty-one eyewitness phenomena. The researchers 
asked experts to assess the reliability of each topic, one of which was showup identifications. A 
relevant statement intended for clarification accompanied each topic. The accompanying 
statement for the topic of showup identifications read, “The use of a one-person showup instead 
of a full lineup increases the risk of misidentification.” (Kassin, Ellsworth and Smith, 1989, p. 
1091)  In addition, researchers asked experts to provide their education and professional 
backgrounds as well as information pertaining to their court experiences. In assessing the 
statement on showup identifications, five (8%) experts indicated that the research was 
inconclusive, nine (14%) experts indicated that research tends to support this statement, 13 (21%) 
experts indicated that this statement is generally reliable, 28 (44%) experts indicated that the 
statement was very reliable and eight (13%) experts indicated that they did not know or they did 
not provide a response. In addition, 83% of the experts indicated that the statement associated 
with showup identifications was reliable enough for presentation in court. Seventy-seven percent 
of experts said they would testify to this statement in court. Twenty-three percent of experts 
admitted to previous testimony supporting this statement. Finally, 29% of experts felt that this 
statement on showup identifications was common sense. As Kassin et al. (1989) noted at the 
time, this comes as a surprise given that when the researchers conducted this questionnaire, there 
was no existing research comparing lineups and showups.  
Best Practices for Conducting Showup Identifications 
 Similar to the opinions of the experts (see Kassin et al. 1989), the Innocence Project 
(2009) and the United States Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence (1999), claim 
that showups are “inherently suggestive”. Both the United States Supreme Court and the 




Canadian Department of Justice recommend using showups only in the rare circumstances that a 
suspect is apprehended within close proximity to the crime, both geographically and temporally 
(Manson v. Brathwaite; Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice, 2004). 
When conducting showups, the U.S. Department of Justice (Technical Working Group, 1999) 
recommends employing five procedural safeguards to avoid prejudicing the eyewitness. First, 
before conducting the showup identification, the officer should document the eyewitness’ 
description of the perpetrator. Second, to limit potential bias associated with the suspect’s 
custody, the officer should consider transporting the eyewitness to the location of the suspect. 
Third, when multiple eyewitnesses are involved, the officer should separate eyewitnesses and 
instruct them to avoid discussing details of the incident with other eyewitnesses, and if one 
eyewitness makes a positive identification, the officer should consider employing alternative 
identification methods with the remaining eyewitnesses. Fourth, the officer should warn the 
eyewitness that the suspect might or might not be the perpetrator. Fifth, the officer should 
document the eyewitness’ confidence level for both identifications and nonidentifications 
(Technical Working Group, 1999, p. 26). However, despite these criticisms and 
recommendations around the use of showup identifications, the little research that exists on 
showups is limited to the studies reviewed above; and, as noted in my review of the showup 
literature, the research does not examine the best-practice recommendations for showups.  
The Current Study 
 There are a number of reasons why it makes sense to focus solely on showups; first, 
archival analyses conducted by Behrman et al. (2001) and Gonzalez et al. (1993) both found 
significantly lower memory intervals in showups. Behrman et al. (2001) found that 49% of lineup 
identifications took place within one to seven days after the occurrence and 47% took place in 
excess of eight days. Conversely, 93% of showups took place within a day of the occurrence 




(Behrman et al. 2001). Further supporting this finding, Gonzalez et al.’s (1993) archival analysis 
found that law enforcement personnel conducted showups between fifteen minutes and two days 
after the occurrence, whereas they conducted lineups between three hours and three weeks after 
the occurrence. This difference in memory intervals is critical given that as the length of time 
between the crime and identification increases, the ability of an eyewitness to make a correct 
identification decreases (Shapiro & Penrod, 1986).  
Second, lineups and showups might differ in environmental contexts. For example, law 
enforcement personnel can conduct showups at the scene of the crime (Behrman et al. 2003; 
Gonzalez et al. 1993; Technical Working Group, 1999), whereas it is unlikely that law 
enforcement personnel could conduct a lineup at the scene of the crime. Showups are therefore 
convenient. 
Third, eyewitnesses might engage in categorically different judgment strategies in 
showups and lineups (Gonzalez et al. 1993). Similar to the hypothesis of Lindsay and Wells 
(1985) that sequential lineups are more likely to encourage absolute judgment decisions than 
simultaneous lineups, Gonzalez et al. (1993) hypothesized that showups might also encourage 
more absolute judgment decisions than simultaneous lineups. Gonzalez et al.’s (1993) data 
supports the notion that participants presented with a showup are more likely to engage in an 
absolute judgment strategy, whereas participants presented with a lineup are more likely to 
employ a relative judgment strategy. Therefore, an eyewitness presented with a showup 
identification would be more likely to compare the suspect to his or her memory for the 
perpetrator, whereas, an eyewitness presented with a simultaneous lineup would be more likely to 
compare the suspect with fillers employing a relative judgment strategy. Use of the absolute 
judgment strategy in sequential presentation has been shown to reduce the risk of false 
identification (Steblay et al. 2001). 




Finally, fourth, like lineups the manner in which showups are conducted is not uniform. 
Showups can be conducted in a variety of environments ranging from the crime scene to the 
courtroom and almost anywhere in between (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Garrett, 2011; Gonzalez 
et al. 1993).  Showups vary greatly by the length of memory retention (Behrman & Davey 2001; 
Gonzalez et al. 1993). And finally, showups vary greatly by the degree of suggestiveness that the 
identification procedure entails (Garrett, 2011). Given the tremendous degree of variability that 
exists within showup identification procedures and the paucity of empirical research that exists 
examining showup identification procedures, it is not only appropriate but also necessary that 
researchers examine showup identifications in their own right. 
 Given the potential benefits of showups and their common use, I will focus exclusively on 
showups, with the primary objective of exploring the effects of contextual variables on 
identification performance. In this experiment, I test hypotheses derived from published work on 
the phenomenology of innocence and script-processing theory, as reviewed in the following 
section.  
Phenomenology of Innocence and the Issue of Denial 
 In his pioneering work on the phenomenology of innocence, Kassin (2005) suggests, 
“innocence might put innocents at risk”. Employing Lerner’s just world theory (see Lerner & 
Simmons, 1966, for example), Kassin (2008) suggests that falsely accused individuals believe in 
“truth” and “justice” and that ultimately, their innocence will come to light. Several DNA-based 
exonerees who had falsely confessed to crimes they did not commit explained that they confessed 
because they believed their innocence would be revealed through further investigation (Kassin, 
2005, 2008; Kassin, Drizin, Grisso, Gudjohnson, Leo, & Redlich, 2009).   
 Kassin (2005) articulates five possible manifestations of innocence that might put 
innocents at risk of wrongful conviction. First, officers are susceptible to believing that an 




innocent suspect is guilty. Second, innocent individuals do not employ their rights to silence or 
counsel. Third, the veracious and robust denials of innocent suspects induce extremely provoking 
interrogations. Fourth, some interrogation methods amplify the likelihood of false confession. 
And, fifth, officers cannot distinguish true and false confessions (Kassin, 2005).  
 A study by Kassin, Holland, and Wells (2005) illustrates the phenomenology of 
innocence in the context of a showup identification.  Upon learning that a police department in 
Louisville, Kentucky, commonly requests that suspects waive their rights to a lineup in favour of 
a showup, Kassin et al. questioned the likelihood that innocent people would sacrifice this right 
as a result of possessing an unwarranted belief that they are unsusceptible to mistaken 
identification.  The experimenters randomly assigned participants to either a guilty or an innocent 
condition to investigate this question. They instructed participants in the guilty condition to 
commit a small theft (for which, an eyewitness was present, who, unbeknownst to the participant, 
was a confederate), throw the stolen object away, and to return to a predetermined location. The 
experimenters instructed participants in the innocent condition to go to a different location, where 
no theft occurred, and to return to the same predetermined location as participants in the guilty 
condition. In both conditions, after arriving at the location, a condition-blind security guard 
apprehended the participant and informed the participant that an eyewitness was present during 
the theft. The participant was then booked and had a mugshot taken. The security officer 
explained that this was a study of eyewitness memory and that the officer was going to put 
together a photographic lineup for identification purposes. Shortly after, the security guard 
explained that there was a lack of composites matching the description of the suspect 
(participant) and that the suspect could either wait half an hour until the officer could obtain the 
remaining composites to complete the lineup or alternatively, the suspect could waive the right to 
a lineup and have his or her photo presented in a showup (Kassin et al. 2005). 




 Overall, 22 of 30 participants waived the lineup; however, 100% of innocent suspects 
waived the lineup, while only 47% of the guilty participants waived the lineup. Participants 
provided three types of reasons for why they decided to waive the lineup: (1) time constraints, (2) 
tactical advantage, and (3) a lack of fear of identification. More interesting, in the guilty 
condition, all participants cited tactical reasons for choosing to waive or wait for the lineup. On 
the contrary, in the innocent condition, all participants waived the lineup, ten citing that they did 
not fear mistaken identification regardless of the procedure employed, five participants cited 
tactical reasons, and three participants cited time constraints. Sixty-seven percent of guilty 
participants predicted that an eyewitness would identify them from a showup identification as 
compared to only 20% of innocent participants. Fifty-three percent of guilty participants 
predicted that the eyewitness would identify them from an eight-person photo array. Whereas, 
only six percent of innocent participants predicted that the eyewitness would identify them from 
an eight-person photo array. Results also indicated a significant interaction effect; as time passed, 
innocent suspects rated the security guard as significantly less suspicious than guilty participants, 
a relationship that was not initially present upon apprehension. This supports the researchers’ 
hypothesis that innocent suspects believe that their innocence is transparent to others. This study 
implies that two aspects of the phenomenology of innocence are active, (1) an illusion of 
transparency, and (2) a naïve faith in human memory (Kassin et al. 2005).  
Script Processing Theory  
Scripts are a form of social schemata individuals employ to facilitate the comprehension 
of event sequences (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Scripts are cognitive structures organized 
around routine events (Abelson, 1981). They enhance the ability of individuals to process social 
information. Episodic memory, which stipulates that memories are stored as individual narratives 
or episodes, is a premise to script processing theory. Episodes are grouped together when a 




sufficient amount are similar and are remembered as a script. When an individual recognizes an 
event for which a script is available, the individual invokes a script in the service of gap filling 
(Schank & Abelson, 1977). Gap filling refers to the assumptions or inferences that an individual 
makes when engaging in an event for which a script is available (Abelson, 1981). Schank and 
Abelson (1977) argue that the storage of analogous episodes as scripts results in a poor account 
for detail; although, they suggest that it is this “economizing” of episodes that makes memory 
possible at all.  Thus, many routine events in which individuals engage – eating at a restaurant, 
purchasing something at a grocery store, and going to the carwash – involve the use of scripts 
(Abelson, 1981; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith, 1980; Schank & Abelson, 1977).  
For example, when a customer enters a restaurant she or he has a series of plans, 
expectations, and goals based on previous experiences, which constitute a script. The owner of 
the restaurant also possesses a series of plans, expectations, and goals based on previous 
experiences, which constitutes a script. Both roles comprise what I will classify as a double 
contingency; if either fails to live up to the expectations of the other, there will be a deviation 
from the script. The customer has an end-goal of fulfilling his or her appetite in exchange for 
money. The owner has an end-goal of making money in exchange for food and service. Upon 
arriving to a restaurant, a host will greet the customer and seat him or her at a table. Next, a 
server will ask the customer what he or she would like to drink and will bring the customer a 
menu. The server does not have to ask the customer if he or she needs a menu, nor does the 
customer have to request a menu. Both parties infer, through gap filling, that having a menu is a 
prerequisite to ordering food. Similarly, when the meal is ready, the customer does not have to 
ask for cutlery, cutlery is already at the table given that both parties know from previous 
experience that cutlery is a requirement to transfer food from the customer’s plate to the 
customer’s mouth. Finally, after the meal, both the customer and owner expect that the customer 




will pay an agreed upon sum of money in exchange for food and service. These are reciprocal 
actions that both parties expect based on previous experiences in the script (Schank & Abelson, 
1977).  
This is an ideal script, according to the plans, expectations, and goals of the actors 
involved. Scripts do not always run according to plan, however. When an individual engages in a 
script in the facilitation of a routine event and some idiosyncratic occurrence takes place, this 
occurrence constitutes a deviation from the script. For example, if there is no cutlery on the table 
when the customer’s meal comes the customer might have to request it, as cutlery is required to 
complete the end-goal of satisfying ones’ hunger. This is a relatively simple example of how 
people employ scripts in routine social situations. Scripts, however, vary in complexity from 
extremely simple, to extremely complex (Schank & Abelson, 1977).  In the following section, I 
will review the possibility of a much more complex script for accusations involving 
transgressions. 
Relevance of the Phenomenology of Innocence and Script Processing Theory to Showup 
Identification Procedures  
One issue of concern in applying script-processing theory in conjunction with the 
phenomenology of innocence to showup identifications is that eyewitnesses probably do not have 
a script for showup identifications, given that the eyewitness has likely never participated in one 
before.  There are elements of the present showup study that are common experiences, 
nevertheless, such as accusations and denials. When an individual accuses an innocent suspect of 
a transgression, the individual can expect that the innocent suspect will immediately deny 
culpability. Alternatively, when an individual accuses a guilty suspect of a transgression, the 
guilty suspect’s behaviour is much more variable (Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005). 
The guilty suspect might deny culpability, but the guilty suspect might also confess.  In a formal 




setting such as an interrogation, the guilty person may invoke his or her right to silence and say 
nothing.  
I predicted that the manner in which an accused individual reacts to an accusation of a 
transgression influences the accuser’s assessment of the suspect’s guilt or innocence. Depending 
on the response of a suspect, he or she will look more or less guilty or innocent. In the accusation 
of a transgression script, the accuser expects an innocent suspect to behave in a particular scripted 
manner. Upon accusation, the accuser expects an innocent suspect to both deny culpability and 
provide an alternative explanation. Other responses are inconsistent with innocent behaviour and 
represent script deviations. If the accused remains silent, this behaviour is likely to be associated 
with guilt, as the accused is acting suspiciously or departing from the common sense assumption 
that innocent suspects are cooperative. Furthermore, given the just world belief that innocent 
individuals are not wrongly identified, why would an innocent suspect invoke his or her right to 
silence? This is the line of reasoning that I would expect from an accuser during the accusation of 
a transgression script. Therefore, the phenomenon of innocence associated with the accusation of 
a transgression is that although the right to remain silent is designed to protect innocent suspects, 
by virtue of employing this right, an innocent suspect might lead observers to infer guilt. 
Likewise, if the accused provides a denial but does not include an explanation, this too 
constitutes a deviation from the scripted behaviour of an innocent suspect. This response might 
appear less guilty than remaining silent, but it still lacks the veracity associated with a denial 
accompanied by an explanation. In the present study, I manipulated the response of accused 
perpetrators and innocent suspects to conform to the three aforementioned responses to the 
accusation of a transgression—silence, denial, and denial and explanation—in a showup 
identification. I evaluated the effects of these different responses on identification performance 
and associated confidence.  




I also manipulated the presence or absence of stolen property during showup 
identifications. The inclusion of this variable was more exploratory in nature; however, this 
variable might also induce script processing. Hypothetically, if law enforcement personnel 
present a perpetrator with stolen property to an eyewitness, the stolen property should have little 
impact as this is in line with the eyewitness’ expectations and the eyewitness should still make an 
identification. Alternatively, if law enforcement personnel present an innocent suspect with 
stolen property to an eyewitness, then a script deviation is present. Either the innocent suspect or 
the stolen property does not belong in the situation. I expect the presence of stolen property to 
increase the rate of mistaken identification.  
In this manner, I expect that the present paradigm will allow for expanding the scope of 
the phenomenology of innocence beyond the interrogation room to account for the outcomes of 
social interactions entailed in other criminal procedures, namely, showup identifications. 
Researchers have used the phenomenology of innocence to explain the reasoning used both by 
law enforcement personnel and innocent suspects during interrogations. In the present study, in 
conjunction with script-processing theory, I expect that the phenomenology of innocence will 
facilitate a greater comprehension of the outcomes associated with showup identification 
procedures.  
In the current study, I used the simulated theft of a backpack and subsequent showup 
identification to evaluate the effects of backpack-presence and the suspect’s verbal behaviour on 
eyewitness identification performance.  I tested the following hypotheses: 
H1: I predict that the verbal behaviour of the suspect will influence the identification decision of 
the eyewitness. Eyewitnesses will be most likely to identify the suspect when he remains silent 
and least likely to identify the suspect when he provides a denial and explanation, regardless of 
whether the target is present or absent. That is, the verbal behaviour of the suspect will not 




predict identification accuracy, but will predict choosing (suspect identification v. suspect non-
identification). 
H2: I predict that the presence of stolen property will influence the identification decision of the 
eyewitness. Eyewitnesses will be more likely to identify the suspect when the stolen property is 
present than when the stolen property is absent, regardless of whether the target is present or 
absent. That is, the stolen property will not predict identification accuracy, but will predict 
choosing (suspect identification v. suspect non-identification). 
  




Chapter 2: Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 270) were recruited via the undergraduate psychology participant pool 
in exchange for extra credit. The proportion of males (N = 134) to females (N = 132) was 
approximately equal. The mean age of participants was 21.06 (SD = 11.018) with 92.2% (245) of 
participants ranging in age from 18 to 22. Of the 264 participants that provided their ethnicities, 
0.4% (1) self-identified as Aboriginal, 6.7% (18) self-identified as Arab/West Indian, 5.6% (15) 
self-identified as Black, 8.2% (22) self-identified as Chinese, 3.4% (9) self-identified as Filipino, 
0.7% (2) self-identified as Latin American, 21.3% (57) self-identified as South Asian, 6.4% (17) 
self-identified as South East Asian, 35.29% (94) self-identified as White, 10.9% (29) self-
identified as Other. 
Design 
 I used a 2 (guilty suspect, innocent suspect) x 2 (backpack-present, backpack-hidden) x 3 
(silence, denial, denial with explanation) x 2 (two perpetrators were used, each served as the 
innocent suspect for the other) between-subjects factorial design.  All participants were assigned 
to conditions randomly. The primary dependent variables are identification decisions and 
confidence. For a table of all variables included in the analysis, see Appendix 1.  
Materials 
 For materials I used a gender-neutral backpack (green and grey; an uncommon color 
combination on campus), informed consent form (Appendix B), release form (Appendix C), 
demographic questionnaire (Appendix D), filler task (Appendix D), hidden camcorder, matching 
shirts and hats for confederates, and walkie-talkies.  




Demographic Questionnaire. Participants were asked to complete a demographic 
questionnaire as part of their filler task. The questionnaire asked participants to provide: gender, 
age, and race. 
Filler Task. In the filler task participants were asked to choose from one of two essays on 
interpersonal situation tasks and to write a response based on their previous experiences 
(Appendix D). 
Actors and Training 
 Both suspects in the present study were twenty-four year old males of average height and 
are of larger proportions. Both confederates are fair skinned with light features. However, facial 
features have moderate resemblance. Participants wore hats during the study to increase 
confederate similarity. Both participants also wore blacks t-shirts and like jeans.  
Procedure 
 Upon arrival to the psychology lab (Psychology Lab 1), the experimenter welcomed the 
participant, escorted him or her to the testing room, and asked the participant to take a 
(predetermined) seat. The experimenter then stated, “I just have to go get the quiz and then we’ll 
get started. I’ll be right back”.  
At this time, the experimenter slipped into a nearby office both to retrieve the quiz and, 
unbeknownst to the participant, to cue the confederates waiting in Psychology Lab 3. Psychology 
Lab 3 is located down the hall and up a flight of stairs, approximately fifty yards away from 
Psychology Lab 1 (see Appendix E for a rough approximation). The experimenter then said, 
“Where did I put that quiz?” into an awaiting walkie-talkie in the office, which cued the awaiting 
confederate to come downstairs towards Psychology lab 2. The experimenter then returned to the 
testing room with the quiz. The quiz contained a demographic questionnaire and the filler task. 
The experimenter then explained the directions and ensured the participant understood his or her 




task. The experimenter then stated, “So, I’m just going to let you get started. I’ll be back when 
your time’s up.” 
At this time, the experimenter exited the testing room (Psychology Lab 1) into 
Psychology Lab 2, closing the door over behind her or him. The experimenter then slipped a 
piece of paper under the door of Psychology Lab 2 into the hallway to cue the awaiting 
confederate, acting as the perpetrator. This was done to ensure that the experimenter was blind to 
whether the suspect during the identification stage of the procedure was the perpetrator. 
Moreover, this alerted the confederate that the participant was in position in Lab 1. The 
confederate then timed two minutes before entering Psychology Lab 1.  
The experimenter ensured that the door to the testing room was closed, forcing the 
perpetrator to push it open upon entering the room. At this time, the perpetrator acted surprised 
and said to the participant “Oh, sorry, I didn’t think anyone was in here.” The perpetrator then 
proceeded to a filing cabinet in sight of the participant and retrieved a backpack before exiting 
through the same door he entered. The total exposure time was approximately ten seconds. The 
perpetrator then returned back upstairs to Psychology Lab 3 and waited four minutes. During this 
time, the target (innocent suspect or perpetrator) placed the bag either beside him (backpack-
present condition) or hidden from the participant’s sight (backpack-hidden condition).  
In the target present condition, the perpetrator – the confederate who actually took the 
backpack in view of the participant – remained in the session as the guilty suspect.  In the target 
absent condition, the perpetrator exited the experiment by hiding in a hallway for the remainder 
of the session and the innocent suspect (whom the participant had not yet seen) remained in the 
session.  After the allotted four minutes, the suspect called the experimenter who answered the 
phone in Psychology lab 1.  The phone was near the participant, so the participant easily 
overheard the experimenter’s end of the conversation. The telephone script was as follows: 





Suspect: Hi, this is (name) 
Experimenter: Hey, how’s it going? 
Suspect: You left your backpack upstairs. 
Experimenter: No, I didn’t leave my bag upstairs. It’s right here.  (Looks over to the filing cabinet 
and notices bag is missing) 
Oh my God! My bag’s not here! My laptop was in it. Which room did you see it in?  
Suspect: It’s in the student study space. 
Experimenter:  I’ve got to get up there right now. I’ve got to go. I’ll call you back. (Hangs up 
phone). 
(Turns to participant) 
Experimenter: I swear I left my backpack on that filing cabinet. Did you see who took it?  
(Wait for response) 
Come on, I have to go check this out. 
 After the phone conversation, the suspect or perpetrator quickly pressed record on the 
video camera and got into position. When the participant and experimenter reached the doorway 
of Psychology Lab 3, the suspect had a book and bottle of water in front of him. In the backpack 
conditions the experimenter said, “Hey, that’s my bag, did you take it”? In the no backpack 
conditions the experimenter said, “Hey, where’s my bag, did you take it”? In the control 
conditions, the suspect said nothing. In the denial conditions, the suspect said, “No, I didn’t take 
your bag”. In the denial with explanation condition, the suspect said, “No, I didn’t take your bag. 
Some guy was in here a few minutes ago. It was probably him”. The experimenter then asked the 
participant, “Is this the guy who took my bag”? After the participant responded, the experimenter 
asked, “On a scale of 1-10, how confident are you in your decision”? After the participant’s 




response, the experimenter explained that this was in fact part of the experiment and that no theft 
actually occurred. The suspect then left the room, while the experimenter verbally debriefed the 
participant. During debriefing, the experimenter asked the participant what she thought the study 
was about, to recall what the suspect said if he said anything at all, and if the stolen property was 
present during the showup identification. 
  




Chapter 3: Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 Of 270 participants who participated in this study, 89.26% (241) provided responses as to 
whether or not they were suspicious that the theft was part of the study. The 29 missing responses 
are attributable to missing video or inaudible responses (the responses were recorded audibly on a 
hidden video camera). Of those 241 participants, only 11.6% (28) were suspicious that the 
simulated-theft was part of the study before the showup identification took place. Forty-four 
percent (120) of the participants were asked if they noticed the presence of the backpack during 
the showup identification. Only 45% (54) of participants who provided valid responses correctly 
recalled the presence or absence of the backpack during the showup identification. One hundred 
twenty participants were asked to recall what the suspect said during the showup identification. 
Sixty-three percent (75) correctly identified what the suspect said. The 150 missing manipulation 
checks are attributable to the following: in 65.1% (97) of cases the experimenter led the 
participant to the correct decision, in 32.9% (50) of cases there was no video or the video was 
inaudible, and, in 2% (3) of cases the experimenter did not ask the question.  
Choosing Rates 
In order to test the hypotheses, I first used logistic regression analysis to test main effects 
and interactions on choosing rates (suspect identification vs. non-identification). All independent 
variables – target, stolen property, and verbal behavior – were included in the model. The cell 
means are displayed in Table 2. The model significantly predicted choosing rates (- 2 Log 
Likelihood = 213.92, Χ2(4) = 43.50, p < .001) and correctly classified 80.4% of cases; however, 
this was no improvement from the constant-only model that also correctly classified 80.4% of 
cases. This suggests that none of the independent variables significantly added to the predictive 
power of the model. 




I hypothesized that the verbal behavior of the suspect would influence choosing rates. 
Specifically, I expected that the suspect would be most likely to be identified when he remained 
silent and least likely to be identified when he provided a denial and explanation (H1). Suspects’ 
verbal behaviour did not significantly effect choosing rates, Wald (2) = .41, p = .813. H1, 
therefore, was not supported.  
I examined the hypothesis that the presence of stolen property would increase choosing 
rates (H2). The presence of stolen property did not significantly affect the eyewitnesses decision 
to choose the suspect, Wald (1) = .44, p = .508. Thus, H2, was not supported. 
The only independent variable that significantly affected choosing rates was target 
presence. When the target was present (N = 144) eyewitnesses were more likely to identify the 
suspect (M = .94, SD = .23) than when the target was absent (N = 116, M = .63, SD = .49), Wald 
(1) = 31.50, p < .001.  
In addition to main effects, I tested for two- and three-way interactions: stolen property x 
target, verbal behavior x target, and stolen property x verbal behavior x target. The two- and 
three-way interactions did not add significantly to the model. When testing for interactions 
between stolen property x target and stolen-property x verbal behavior x target, final solutions 
could not be reached as the – 2 Log Likelihood iterations never reached convergence.   
For exploratory purposes I also tested the effects of participants’ ethnicity and gender on 
choosing rates. For the purpose of logistic regression analysis participants’ ethnicities were coded 
as White (N = 90), South or South East Asian (N = 73), and other (N = 92). Ethnicity did not 
significantly predict choosing rates, - 2 Log Likelihood = 249.17, Χ2(2) = 3.24, p = .198, and 
correctly classified 80.4% of cases, which was no improvement from the constant-only model 
which also correctly classified 80.4% of cases. Gender did significantly predict choosing rates, - 
2 Log Likelihood = 245.66, Χ2(1) = 10.45, p = .001, and correctly classified 80.2% of cases; 




however, this was no improvement from the constant-only model that also correctly classified 
80.2% of cases. Female eyewitnesses were more likely to choose the suspect (N = 127, M = .88, 
SD = .32) than were male eyewitnesses (N = 130, M = .72, SD = .45). 
Identification Accuracy 
I examined the impact of the independent variables on identification accuracy (correct vs. 
incorrect) using logistic regression. All independent variables – target, stolen property, and verbal 
behavior - were included in the model. The cell means are displayed in Table 4.  The model 
significantly predicted accurate identification decisions, - 2 Log Likelihood = 208.07, Χ2(4) = 
114.99, p < .001, and correctly classified 79.6% of cases. The constant-only model correctly 
classified 68.8% of cases, suggesting that the independent variables increased the predictive 
power of the model. Stolen property significantly predicted identification accuracy, Wald (1) = 
4.26, p = .0392.  Eyewitnesses were less accurate when the stolen property was absent (N = 128, 
M = .36, SD = .48) than when the stolen property was present (N = 132, M = .27, SD = .44). 
Verbal behavior did not contribute to the predictive power of the model Wald (2) = 2.19, p = .33. 
Two- and three-way interactions did not significantly add to the model.  
Next, the effects of target were examined. Target significantly predicted identification 
accuracy, Wald (1) = 66.90, p < .001. Eyewitnesses were more likely to make a correct 
identification decision when the perpetrator was present (N = 144, M = .06, SD = .23) than when 
the perpetrator was absent (N = 116, M = .63, SD = .49). 
I also examined the effects of ethnicity and gender on identification accuracy. Ethnicity 
did not significantly predict accuracy, - 2 Log Likelihood = 315.66, Χ2(2) = 1.42, p = .49, and 
                                                      
2 I also conducted the analysis excluding those participants whom were suspicious that the theft was part of the study 
(N = 28). Given that both the stolen property and the target remained significant predictors of identification accuracy 
and that I have no empirical bases to suggest that participants who believe that an actual theft occurred differ from 
those participants that believed no theft occurred, I included all participants in the statistical analyses. 




correctly classified 69% of cases, which was no improvement from the constant-only model that 
also correctly classified 69% of cases. Likewise, gender did not significantly predict 
identification accuracy, - 2 Log Likelihood = 318.30, Χ2(1) = .44, p = .51, and correctly classified 
68.9% of cases, which was no improvement from the constant-only model which also correctly 
classified 68.9% of cases.  
Eyewitness Confidence  
 I conducted a 2 (target) x 2 (stolen property) x 3 (verbal behavior) ANOVA on eyewitness 
confidence.  Participants were more confident when the target was present (N = 142, M = 8.33, 
SD = 1.91) than when the target was absent (N = 113, M = 7.03, SD = 2.55), F(1, 243) = 21.51, p 
< .001. There was no significant main effect of presence of stolen property, F(1, 243) = 0.07, p = 
.79, or suspect verbal behavior, F(2, 243) = 1.00, p = .37. There were no significant interactions. 
  A moderate correlation was identified between choosing and confidence, r(251) = .35, p 
< .001. No significant correlation was found between identification accuracy and confidence, 
r(251) = -.06, p = .32.  
  




Chapter 4: Discussion 
Neither the verbal behaviour of the suspect nor the presence of stolen property influenced 
the identification decisions (positive identification v. rejection) of eyewitnesses. Target was the 
only variable that predicted the identification decisions of eyewitnesses. Although neither 
hypothesis garnered support, the presence of stolen property, surprisingly, increased the accuracy 
of eyewitnesses. My initial hypothesis that the presence of stolen property would increase suspect 
identifications (H2) rested on the assumption that the presence of stolen property would increase 
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure, thereby leading to more suspect 
identifications. Results suggest, however, that the presence of stolen property might have served 
as a contextual cue to remembering, facilitating greater eyewitness identification accuracy.  
A context effect refers to the presence of some cognitive or environmental stimulus 
during or prior to the retrieval phase of memory that services to facilitate or diminish memory 
performance (Davies & Thomson, 1988).  There are three processes of memory: encoding, 
storage, and retrieval (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). During the encoding phase, individuals 
actively input to be remembered information into memory storage.  During the storage phase, 
individuals do exactly that – store the memory for later. Finally, during the retrieval stage of 
memory, participants retrieve memories for tasks of recognition or recall. All three stages of 
memory are prone to error (Cutler, 2006; Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Dysart et al., 2006). Human 
memory does not work like a video recorder, storing information to be played like a DVD later, it 
is much more fallible (Loftus & Loftus, 1980). The act of remembering is a coalescence of stored 
information and information available in the rememberers’ cognitive or social environment 
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Therefore, in the present study, the memory of the eyewitness for 
both the crime and the suspect is attributable not only to how she encodes the crime but also to 
her present environment. Although context effects have a potent and replicable history in tasks of 




recall, the effects are rare in tasks of recognition as the stimulus itself provides a powerful cue to 
recognition; this has been touted as the outshining hypothesis (Smith, 1988).  Thus, during a 
target-present eyewitness identification procedure (perhaps even during a target-absent procedure 
in which the innocent suspect bears a high resemblance to the perpetrator) one might not expect 
to find a context effect. There are circumstances, nevertheless, in which the target or the stimulus 
in an identification procedure might not provide a powerful cue to recognition, and in such 
instances contextual cues might be particularly beneficial (Cutler & Penrod, 1988). 
Instances in which the target might not serve as an effective contextual cue include: when 
estimator variables such as a disguise are present during encoding, when memory intervals are 
longer, and when factors that affect accurate retrieval, such as biased lineup instructions, are 
present (Cutler & Penrod, 1988). Cutler and Penrod (1988) examined two separate context 
reinstatement techniques; the first, the context reinstatement interview, was employed before the 
lineup and consisted of mnemonic instructions, photos from the crime scene, and presenting the 
eyewitness with his or her written description of events. The second context reinstatement 
technique, in which physical characteristics served as contextual cues, entailed exposing 
eyewitnesses to the posture, gait, voice, skin colour, and three-quarter view of the suspect. In 
addition to the two contextual reinstatement techniques, Cutler and Penrod (1988) manipulated 
lineup instructions, memory interval, target presence, disguise, weapon visibility, lineup size, and 
the degree of similarity between suspects and fillers (high v. low). Findings indicated that context 
cues were moderating the effects of variables that inhibit identification accuracy. Amongst 
participants who did not receive a context reinstatement interview, eyewitnesses who viewed a 
non-disguised perpetrator performed significantly better than eyewitnesses who viewed a 
disguised perpetrator; however, amongst participants that did receive the context reinstatement 
interview there was no significant difference. This suggests that the context reinstatement 




interview had the potential to nullify the adverse effects that might be associated with an 
eyewitness identification in which the perpetrator wore a disguise during the commission of an 
offence.  
Likewise, Cutler and Penrod (1988) also found that the context reinstatement interview 
provided a similar curative value for correcting the negative effect of biased lineup instructions 
on identification accuracy. Amongst participants who did not receive the context reinstatement 
interview, biased lineup instructions significantly reduced identification accuracy. Biased lineup 
instructions had no significant effect on identification accuracy amongst participants who did 
receive a context reinstatement interview, however. In terms of choosing rates, the contextual 
reinstatement interview significantly reduced the effect of biased lineup instructions. Amongst 
participants who did not receive the context reinstatement interview the effect of biased lineup 
instructions was quite potent (d = 0.96) with participants in the biased lineup instruction 
condition choosing 99% of the time and participants receiving neutral lineup instructions 
choosing 65% of the time. Amongst participants who did receive the context reinstatement 
interview, the effect size was much more modest (d = 0.51) with participants in the biased lineup 
instruction condition choosing 89% of the time and participants receiving neutral lineup 
instructions choosing 71% of the time.  
The presence of physical contextual cues produced similar results. The physical cues 
improved identification performance in high-similarity suspect lineups but produced no 
advantage in low-similarity suspect lineups. Physical cues improved identification performance 
in the two-week memory interval but not in the two-day retention interval. Physical cues also 
benefited eyewitness who were not shown mugshots prior to the lineup identification procedures 
but produced no advantage in lineup identifications contaminated by previous exposure to 
mugshots (Cutler & Penrod, 1988).  




Both increasing the exposure of suspect characteristics and the use of a context 
reinstatement interviews have curative value for eyewitness identification procedures plagued by 
poor viewing conditions or suggestive procedures (Cutler & Penrod, 1988). Results from the 
present study suggest that the presence of objects from the scene of the crime during the 
identification procedure might also service as a cue to remembering. In the present study both 
suspects wore the same black t-shirts and hats and similar blue jeans. Previous research suggests 
that a hat is a form of disguise (Cutler, 2006) and that clothing bias inhibits accurate 
identification decisions (Dysart et al. 2006). The presence of these variables might have made the 
identification task difficult enough that the target no longer “outshined” the environmental 
context. Fittingly, the presence of the stolen property during both encoding and retrieval 
processes of memory appeared to improve identification accuracy.  
The suspects’ verbal behaviour had no effect on the choosing rates or the accuracy of 
eyewitnesses. It could be that the verbal behaviour of the suspect as defined in the present study 
just does not influence identification performance in showups; however, it could also be that the 
manipulation was not successful. Only 62.5% of participants were able to correctly recall what 
the suspect said during the identification procedure. Additional research is needed before one can 
confidently draw conclusions about the suspect’s verbal behaviour. 
An implication that can perhaps be derived from the present study is that one does not 
want to be presented to an eyewitness in a showup identification procedure. Regardless of 
culpability, participants chose the suspect 80% (N = 260) of the time in the present study; even 
when the suspect was innocent he was still chosen 63% (N = 116) of the time. The mere rate of 
choosing associated with a showup identification procedure is alarming. Although this choosing 
rate might have been exacerbated by the difficulty of the identification task (disguise and clothing 




bias), this finding should not be overlooked. Further research examining the choosing rates 
associated with showup identification procedures is recommended.  
Although very few participants recognized that the simulated theft was part of the study 
and no participants recognized that this study examined the presence of stolen property and the 
suspects’ verbal behaviour on identification performance, this study was not without limitations. 
More than half of the manipulation checks regarding the suspects’ verbal behaviour went awry. 
Manipulation checks were recorded audibly on a hidden video camera during the debriefing 
session.  Only a portion of the manipulation checks represented valid responses, primarily due to 
technological issues and experimenters leading participants. Given that only 120 participants had 
valid responses for this manipulation check, further examination of this variable was not possible. 
Logistic regression requires larger sample sizes and is inadvisable when there is a large ratio of 
independent variables to sample size (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002). Had there been more valid 
responses to the manipulation check, further analysis could have been conducted, such as by 
excluding participants who failed the manipulation check. Consequently, my conclusions 
regarding the effect of the suspects’ verbal behaviour manipulation are tentative. Future studies 
should examine the effects of suspects’ verbal behaviour on eyewitness identification 
performance in showup procedures. 
  




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The mere rate of choosing associated with showup identification procedures raises 
concern. Yet, the identification procedure receives regular use (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Garrett, 
2011; Gonzalez et al. 1993) and there is little if any reason to believe that this will change in the 
near future. It might be that there is an “inherent suggestiveness” (Innocence Project, 2009; 
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999) associated with an identification 
procedure that contains only one member. As mentioned in the introduction, however, showup 
identification procedures also offer several distinct advantages over other identification 
procedures. Due to their close temporal proximity, showups limit the effects of memory decay. 
Suspects identified as innocent are immediately released from custody (Gonzalez et al. 1993). 
And, showups create reasonable and probable grounds for detaining potentially guilty suspects. 
For these reasons showup identification procedures have a valuable place in the justice system. 
Therefore, instead of comparing showups and lineups – two procedures intended for different 
situations and both offering relative advantages – there is much greater utility in examining the 
potential for the development of best-practice recommendations for showup identification 
procedures. 
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Government of Canada recommend the use of 
showups only when a suspect is located both geographically and temporally proximal to the 
scene of the crime (FPT Working Group, 2004; Manson v. Brathwaite). Yet, archival data 
suggests that there is a tremendous degree of variation that exists from one showup identification 
procedure to another and that showups are sometimes conducted neither geographically nor 
temporally proximal to the scene of the crime (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Garrett, 2011; Gonzalez 
et al. 1993). As the innocence data illustrates, the courts often accept these showups that are not 
conducted near the scene of the crime (Behrman, 2011). Empirical research should explore the 




potential advantages of conducting showups temporally and geographically proximal to the scene 
of the crime over showups that do not meet these criteria. If crime-scene showups do provide a 
significant advantage over other varieties of showups, an empirical basis to this claim could urge 
courts to exclude showups conducted away from the crime-scene.  Future research should 
consider examining such potential differences in addition to other system variables that might 
increase the accuracy of eyewitnesses in showup identification procedures. For example, perhaps 
the high tendency to make a positive identification from a showup could be dampened through 
instructions and cautions. Further research can examine this possibility. 
This study is unique in that it is amongst the first to employ a simulated-theft paradigm to 
examine the effects of system variables on eyewitness identification performance from live 
showup identification procedures. When considering verisimilitude, which in relation to showup 
identification procedures refers to the plausibility that a similar scenario might occur naturally 
during a criminal investigation, methods such as the one employed in the present study are 
essential. There is no telling what differences might exist between participants that knowingly 
witness a staged theft or innocuously meet a target in public and eyewitnesses that witness actual 
crimes. Therefore, researchers should seek to mirror actual crimes in their studies as closely as 
possible. Past studies on showups have often presented participants with photographs of suspects 
as opposed to presenting the actual suspect in a live presentation – likely to be consistent with the 
lineup procedures with which the showups were being compared. When showups are used in a 
manner consistent with the recommendations set out by the Government of Canada or the United 
States Supreme Court, however, it is highly unlikely that the suspect would be presented to the 
eyewitness in a photograph. Hypothetically, if both the eyewitness and a suspect who matches the 
description of the perpetrator were in close proximity to the scene of the crime, why would law 
enforcement present the suspect to the eyewitness in the form of a photograph? In most instances 




it would be very peculiar if law enforcement personnel were to search for or take a photograph of 
a suspect whom is already present at the scene of the crime. Unlike lineups, showups do not 
entail the need for fillers and therefore it is much more practical for a showup to be conducted 
live. Both archival analyses that distinguished between live and photographic showup procedures 
support this reasoning, suggesting that the overwhelming majority of showup identification 
procedures are conducted in a live format (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Gonzalez et al. 1993). 
Beyond contributing to the dearth of literature on showup identification procedures, I hope this 
study provides the catalyst necessary to urge other researchers to use similar methods in future 
research examining best-practice recommendations for showups. 
  





Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. American Psychologist, 36, 715 
– 729. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.36.7.715 
Behrman, B. W., & Davey, S. L. (2001). Eyewitness identification in actual criminal cases: An 
archival analysis. Law and Human Behaviour, 25, 475 – 491. doi: 
10.1023/A:1012840831846 
Berger, P. L. & Luckmann, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge. London, England: Penguin Books. 
Carlson, C. A., Gronlund, S. D., & Clark, S. E. (2008). Lineup composition, suspect position, and 
the sequential lineup advantage. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 14, 118 – 
128. doi: 10.1037/1076-898X.14.2.118 
Cutler, B. L. (2006). A sample of witness, crime, and perpetrator characteristics affecting 
eyewitness identification accuracy. Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal, 4, 327 
– 340.  
Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Martens, T. K. (1987). Improving the reliability of eyewitness 
identification: Putting context into context. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72, 629 – 637. 
doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.72.4.629 
Cutler, B. L. & Penrod, S. D. (1988). Context reinstatement and eyewitness identification. In 
Davies, G. M. & Thomson, D. M. (Ed.) Memory in Context: Context in Memory (pp. 231 
– 244). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Davies, G. M. & Thomson, D. M. (1988). Introduction. In Davies, G. M. & Thomson, D. M. 
(Ed.) Memory in Context: Context in Memory (pp. 1 – 10). New York, NY: John Wiley & 
Sons. 




Dysart, J. E., Lindsay, R. C. L., & Dupuis, P. R. (2006). Show-ups: The critical issue of clothing 
bias. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 1009 – 1023. doi: 10.1002/acp.1241 
FPT Heads of Prosecutions Committee Working Group. (2004). Report on the Prevention of 
Miscarriages of Justice. Ottawa, ON: Department of Justice Canada. Retrieved March 30, 
2010, from: http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/pmj-pej/p5.html#cont 
Garrett, B. L. (2011). Eyewitness misidentifications. In B. L. Garrett (Ed.), Convicting the 
Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong, (pp. 93 – 159). Harvard University 
Press. 
Gonzalez, R., Ellsworth, P. C., & Pembroke, M. (1993). Response biases in lineups and showups. 
Attitudes and Social Cognition, 64, 525 – 537. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.64.4.525 
Goodsell, C. A., Neuschatz, J. S., & Gronlund, S. D. (2009). Effects of mugshot commitment on 
lineup performance in young and older adults. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23, 788 – 
803. doi: 10.1002/acp.1512 
Graesser, A. C., Woll, S. B., Kowalski, D. J., & Smith, D. A. (1980). Memory for typical and 
atypical actions in scripted activities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Learning and Memory, 6, 503 – 515. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.6.5.503 
Innocence Project (2009). Reevaluating lineups: Why witnesses make mistakes and how to reduce 
the chance of a misidentification. Retrieved August 30, 2009, from 
http://innocenceproject.org. 
Innocence Project. (n.d.). Retrieved April 14, 2011, from: http://innocenceproject.org/ 
Kassin, S. M. (2005). On the psychology of wrongful convictions: Does innocence put innocents 
at risk? American Psychologist, 60, 215 – 228. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.60.3.215 




Kassin, S. M. (2008). False confessions: Causes, consequences, and implications for reform. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17, 249 – 253. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
8721.2008.00584.x 
Kassin, S. M., Drizin, S. A., Grisso, T., Gudjohnsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., & Redlich, A. D. (2010). 
Police-induced confessions, risk factors, and recommendations. Law and Human 
Behaviour, 34, 3 – 38. doi: 10.1007/s10979-009-9188-6 
Kassin, S. M., Ellsworth, P. C. & Smith, V. L. (1989). The “general acceptance” of psychological 
research on eyewitness testimony: A survey of the experts. American Psychologist, 44, 
1089 – 1098. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.44.8.1089 
Kassin, S. M., Holland, L. C., & Wells, G. L., (2005, unpublished). Why suspects waive their 
right to a lineup: A study in the risk of actual innocence. 
Leach, A.- M., Cutler, B. L., & Van Wallendael, L. (2009).  Lineups and eyewitness 
identification. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 5, 157 – 158. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131529 
Lerner, M. J. & Simmons, C. H. (1966). Observer’s reaction to the “innocent victim”: 
Compassion or rejection? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 203 – 210. 
doi: 10.1037/h0023562 
Lindsay, R. C. L., & Wells, G. L. (1985). Improving eyewitness identifications from lineups: 
Simultaneous versus sequential lineup presentation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70, 
556 – 564. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.70.3.556 
Loftus, E. F. & Loftus, G. R. (1980). On the permanence of stored information in the human 
brain. American Psychologist, 35, 409 -420. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.35.5.409 
Manson v. Brathwaite, [1976] 432 U.S. LEXIS 116 




Malpass, R. S. & Devine, P. G. (1981). Eyewitness identification: Lineup instructions and the 
absence of the offender. Journal of Applied Psychology, 66, 482 – 489. doi: 
10.1037/0021-9010.66.4.482 
Malpass, R. S., Tredoux, C. G., & McQuiston-Surrett, D. (2009). Response to Lindsay, Mansour, 
Beaudry, Leach, and Bertrand’s ‘Sequential lineup presentation: Patterns and policy.’ 
Legal and Criminological Psychology, 14, 25 – 30. doi: 10.1348/135532508X384094 
Mertler, C. A., & Vannatta, R. A. (2002). Advanced and Multivariate Statistical Methods (2nd ed.). 
Los Angeles, CA: Pyrczak Publishing. 
Phillips, M. R., McAuliff, B. D., Kovera, M. B., & Cutler, B. L. (1999). Double-blind photoarray 
administration as a safeguard against investigator bias. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
84, 940 – 951. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.84.6.940 
Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., Narchet, F. M., & Kassin, S. M. (2005). Investigating true and false 
confessions within a novel experimental paradigm. Psychological Science, 16, 481 – 486. doi: 
10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01560 
Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry 
into Human Knowledge Structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Publishers. 
Shapiro, P. N., & Penrod, S. (1986). A meta-analysis of facial identification studies. Psychological 
Bulletin, 100, 139 – 156. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.100.2.139 
Smith, S. M. (1988). Environmental context – dependent memory. In Davies, G. M. & Thomson, D. 
M. (Ed.) Memory in Context: Context in Memory (pp. 231 – 244). New York, NY: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Steblay, N. (1997). Social influence in eyewitness recall: A meta-analytic review of lineup instruction 
effects. Law and Human Behaviour, 21, 283 – 297. doi: 10.1023/A:1024890732059 




Steblay, N., Dysart, J. E., Fulero, S., & Lindsay, R. C. L. (2001). Eyewitness accuracy rates in 
sequential and simultaneous lineup presentations: A meta-analytic comparison. Law and 
Human Behaviour, 25, 459 – 473. doi: 10.1023/A: 1012888715007 
Steblay, N., Dysart, J. E., Fulero, S., & Lindsay, R. C. L. (2003). Eyewitness accuracy rates in police 
showup and lineup presentations: A meta-analytic comparison. Law and Human Behaviour, 
27, 523 – 540. doi: 10.1023/A:1025438223608 
Vrij, A. (1997). Wearing black clothes: The impact of offenders’ and suspects’ clothing on 
impression formation. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 11, 47 – 53. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0720(199702)11:1<47::AD-ACP421>3.0.CO;2-H 
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence. (1999). Eyewitness evidence: A guide for law 
enforcement. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice.  Retrieved November 
15, 2009, from: 
http://www.google.ca/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=eyewitness+evidence+a+guide+for+law
+enforcement&meta=&aq=0&aqi=g1&aql=&oq=eyewitness+evidence%3A+a+&gs_rfai= 
Thomson, D. M. & Tulving, E. (1970). Associative encoding and retrieval: Weak and strong cues. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 86, 255 – 262. doi: 10.1037/h0029997 
Tulving, E. & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in episodic 
memory. Psychological Review, 80, 352 – 373. doi: 10.1037/h0020071 
Wells, G. L. (1978). Applied eyewitness-testimony research: System variables and estimator 
variables. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1546 – 1557. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.36.12.1546 
Wells, G. L. (1984). The psychology of lineup identifications. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 14, 89 – 103. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1984.tb02223.x 




Wells, G. L. & Luus, A. E. (1990). Police lineups as experiments: Social methodology as a 
framework for properly conducted lineups. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
16, 106 – 117. doi: 10.1177/0146167290161008 
Wells, G. L., & Turtle, J. W. (1986). Eyewitness identification: The importance of lineup models. 
Psychological Bulletin, 99, 320 – 329. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.99.3.320 
Wells, G. L., Leippe, M. R., & Ostrom, T. M. (1979). Guidelines for empirically assessing the 
fairness of a lineup. Law and Human Behavior, 2, 285 – 293. doi: 10.1007/BF01039807 
Wells, G. L., Malpass, R. S., Lindsay, R. C. L., Fisher, R. P., Turtle, J. W. & Fulero, S. M. 
(2000). From the lab to the police station: A successful application of eyewitness 
research. American Psychologist, 55, 581 – 598. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.55.6.581 
Yarmey, A. D., Yarmey, A. L., & Yarmey, M. J. (1994). Face and voice identifications in 
showups and lineups. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 8, 453 – 464. doi: 
10.1002/acp.2350080504 
Yarmey, A. D., Yarmey, M. J., & Yarmey, A. L. (1996). Accuracy of eyewitness identifications 
in showups and lineups. Law and Human Behaviour, 20, 459 – 477. doi: 
10.1007/BF01498981 
  




Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table 1: Variables Included in the Statistical Analysis 
                                                      
3  “No, I didn’t take your bag”. 
4  “No, I didn’t take your bag. Some guy was just in here. It was probably him”. 
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CONFIDENCE Confidence is 
defined as how 
confident the 





“On a scale of 
1-10, how 
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Ordinal Discrete N/A 
Hypothesis 1 Remaining silent will increase the rate of suspect identification. Denial with an 
explanation will decrease the rate of suspect identification. 
Hypothesis 2 The presence of stolen property will increase the rate of suspect identification. 




Table 2: Choosing Rate Cell Means 








   Totals(%): 
Target  Silence 100 (24) 92 (24) 96 (48) 
Present  Denial 100 (26) 92 (24) 96 (50) 
  Denial+Explanation 100 (23) 83 (23) 91 (46) 
  Total: 100 (73) 89 (71)   94 (144) 
Target 
Absent 
      
  Silence 65 (20) 61 (18) 63 (38) 
  Denial 55 (20) 58 (19) 56 (39) 
  Denial+Explanation 60 (20) 79 (19) 69 (39) 
  Total: 60 (60) 66 (56)   63 (116) 
Totals:     82 (133)   79 (127)   80 (260) 
N = (260). Suspect Identifications: 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
 
  




Table 3: Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Identification Decision 
Variable Β SE Β eB 
Target -2.61* .8 .07 
Stolen Property .23 .34 1.26 
Denial .04 1.02 1.04 
Denial+Explanation -.79 .89 .46 
Denial*Target Absent -.32 1.12 .73 
Denial+Explanation*Target 
Absent 
1.07 1.02 2.91 
Constant                                 3.03 
- 2LL                               211.73 
Χ2                                 16.1 
df                                   6 
Cox and Snell R2                                45.68 
Note: eB = exponentiated B. -2 LL = -2 Log Likelihood. Independent variable codings: target (0= present, 1=  
absent), Stolen Property (0= absent, 1= present), and Verbal Behaviour (0= silent, 1= denial, and 2= 
denial+explanation). Dependent variable codings: identification accuracy (0= No, 1= Yes). 
*p < .05 
  




Table 4: Identification Accuracy Cell Means 












Target  Silence 100 (24) 92 (24) 96 (48) 
Present  Denial 100 (26) 92 (24) 96 (50) 
  Denial+Explanation 100 (23) 83 (23) 91 (46) 





    
  Silence 35 (20) 39 (18) 37 (38) 
  Denial 45 (20) 42 (19) 44 (39) 
  Denial+Explanation 40 (20) 21 (19) 31 (39) 
  Total: 40 (60) 34 (56) 37 (116) 
Total:   73 (133) 65 (127) 69 (260) 
N = 260. Identification Accuracy: 1 = yes, 0 = no.  




Table 5: Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Identification Accuracy 
Variable Β SE Β eB 
Target 3.77* .81 43.43 
Stolen Property -.73* .35 .48 
Denial -.03 1.02 .97 
Denial+Explanation .79 .9 2.21 
Denial*Target Absent -.27 1.13 .76 
Denial+Explanation*Target 
Absent 
-.54 1.02 .58 
Constant                                   -2.83 
- 2 LL                                   207.78 
Χ2                                   114.79 
df                                       6 
Cox and Snell R2                                     .36 
 
Note: eB = exponentiated B. -2 LL = -2 Log Likelihood. Independent variable codings: target (0= present, 1=  
absent), Stolen Property (0= absent, 1= present), and Verbal Behaviour (0= silent, 1= denial, and 2= 
denial+explanation). Dependent variable codings: identification accuracy (0= correct, 1= incorrect). 
*p < .05. 
  
















  Silence 90 (24) 81 (22) 85 (46) 
  Denial 82 (26) 77 (25)  80 (51) 
  Denial 
+Explanation 
85 (23)  90 (21) 87 (44) 





    
  Silence 73 (19) 79 (17) 76 (36) 
  Denial  70 (19) 73 (19) 71 (38) 
  Denial 
+Explanation 






















  80 (39) 
75 (44) 
77 (42) 





    78 (82) 
  Totals:  79 (128)  77 (125)  78 (253) 
N = (253).  
 
  





Table 7: Confidence Correlated with Accuracy by Condition 
Perpetrator Present   Accuracy (1 = 
Incorrect) 






  .014 
   140 
Perpetrator Absent     





  .311 
  .001 
   110 
Totals:    






  .286 
   250 
 
  




Appendix B: Consent Form 
	  
You have been invited to voluntarily participate in the following research project: Accuracy of Identifications from 
Showups. In this study, you viewed a simulated theft. Then, you were asked various questions about the person who 
was suspected of committing the theft. The purpose of this study is to learn how a suspect’s denials can affect 
witnesses’ identification decisions. The entire session should last approximately one half hour.  
There are no known physical, psychological, economic, or social risks associated with this study. Your participation 
in this study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from this study at any time without any consequences or 
penalties. You are not obliged to answer any questions that you find objectionable or which make you 
uncomfortable. You will be given one half credit for your participation in this study. Full credit will be awarded 
whether you complete the study or not. 
All information will be coded and stored in a secure area. Only the primary researcher, his assistants, and other 
researchers interested in psychology will have access to the data (e.g., for meta-analyses). Individual performance 
will remain confidential and will not be released to professors, employers or in publications. Only group results will 
be reported (e.g., conferences presentations, journal articles).     
This study has been reviewed and cleared by the Research Ethics Board at UOIT (REB # 08-076). The principal 
investigator is Dr. Brian Cutler of the Faculty of Criminology, Justice, and Policy Studies, UOIT. In the event that 
you have any questions, concerns, or complaints, you may contact any of the following individuals: Dr. Cutler 
(brian.cutler@uoit.ca; 905-721-8668 ext. 3807) or the compliance office (compliance@uoit.ca; 905-721-8668, ext. 
3693). 
  
I have read and understood the statements above. I have had my questions answered to my satisfaction and I 
understand that I may ask additional questions at any time. My signature, below, indicates my free and informed 
consent to participate in this research.   
Name (please print)  _________________________ 
 
Signature  _______________________  
 
Date  _________________________                   
  








During this study you were recorded with a hidden video camera. For a variety of studies we use recordings of 
people (still photographs and/or videotapes, voice recordings, etc.). In eyewitness identification studies, the videos 
are shown to people who are asked to determine whether witnesses are accurate. Other studies could involve the use 
of these stimuli for cue analysis, training, or any number of other purposes. These materials will be used as stimuli in 
research and may be presented for illustration at conferences and in classes or shared with other researchers doing 
similar work. 
 Results of the research will not identify anyone by name; all data are strictly confidential. Similarly, you 
will never be identified by name when the recordings of you are used or presented. 
 You are free to withdraw your permission to use these materials. Note that we will not be able to guarantee 
that other researchers that we share stimuli with would delete your materials. We believe that this is acceptable as we 
see no negative consequences of these materials being used. However, if you have any concerns, please do not sign 
this form and we will erase the materials now. 
 Your signature below indicates that you are aware of all potential uses of these materials and agree to 
permit such uses.  
 This research is conducted by students and research assistants of Dr. Brian Cutler (brian.cutler@uoit.ca; 
905-721-8668 ext. 3807). If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this experience, please contact Dr. 
Cutler or the compliance office (compliance@uoit.ca; 905-721-8668, ext. 3693) 
 















P: ___________   C: ___________   Date: ___________ 




Please provide the following information: 
1.  Gender:   Male         Female 
2.  Age:  ___ years 
3. Race (check the one that most describes you):  
______  Aboriginal (Inuit, Métis, North American Indian)  
______  Arab/West Asian (e.g., Armenian, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, Moroccan) 
______  Black (e.g., African, Haitian, Jamaican, Somali) 
______  Chinese 
______  Filipino 
______ Hispanic 
______  Japanese 
______  Korean 
  ______  Latin American 
______  South Asian 
______  South East Asian 
______ White (Caucasian) 
             ______  Other ________________________ 
4. University or College Major _________________________ 
Year in Program: 1    2    3  4 
5: What is your occupation? If not employed, write "student"   _______________________ 
6: What is your level of employment?  
Not employed  
Part-time employed  
Full-time employed  
7: What languages do you speak fluently? ____________________ 
 
  




Interpersonal Situations Task 
 
You will have a choice between the two topics below. Each topic is a brief quotation that 
states or implies an issue of general interest. Read each topic carefully; then decide on 
which topic you could write a more effective and well-reasoned response. Plan and compose 
a response that presents your perspective on the topic you select. You are free to accept, 
reject, or qualify the claim made in the topic you selected, as long as the ideas you present 
are clearly relevant to the topic. Support your views with reasons and examples drawn 
from such areas as your reading, experience, observations, or academic studies. 
OPTION 1: "People work more productively in teams than individually. Teamwork requires cooperation, 
which motivates people much more than individual competition does." 
 
OPTION 2: "High-speed electronic communications media, such as electronic mail and television, tend 



















Appendix E: Lab Layout 
 
 
 
  
